In the post-Cold War era, globalization is a major source of global disorder and, considering the factor of globalization constant, the solution lies in introducing sovereign obligation beyond borders. This is the central idea of the book.The book consists of two major themes: World Order 1.0 and World Order 2.0.World Order 1.0Before 1648, the world was full of disorder. A conflict born of frequent interference inside the borders of one’s neighbours had been the norm. The strongest entity, whatsoever it was, imposed the order.However, four centuries ago, in January 1648, in Europe, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War (a part-religious, part-political struggle within and across borders that raged across much of Europe for three decades), and the concept of sovereignty surfaced first time in the form of the right of states to an independent existence and autonomy. The order established consequently “revolved around states and above all the major powers of the day. The principal element of the new order was a shared respect for one another’s sovereignty, something that reduced the frequency and intensity of meddling in what was understood to be one another’s internal affairs and, as a result, the chance of war. Buttressing acceptance of this principle – a common definition of what was legitimate when it came to foreign policy – were a balance of power [involving independent states as sovereign states that do not interfere in one another’s ‘internal business’] and a regular diplomatic process that helped manage what could turn out to be challenges to the existing order” (p. 209).Order cannot be established without legitimacy. “It is useful to deconstruct the concept of order, to break it down into its most essential elements. One critical element of order is the concept of ‘legitimacy’ defined by [Henry] Kissinger to mean ‘international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy” (p. 21). Kissinger made clear that “order depended both on there being rules and arrangements to govern international relations and on a balance of power” (p. 22). On the other hand, “Disorder, as explained by both [Hedley] Bull and Kissinger, reflects the ability of those who are dissatisfied with existing arrangements to change them, including through the use of violence” (p. 22).Over the years, the world had gone conscious of human rights and liberty and after the respect for a state sovereignty, respect for human sovereignty was major goal achieved. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, notes that every person on the planet without exception possesses a broad and extensive range of rights…Still it is noteworthy in expressing the position that states are not the only ones with rights” (p. 64). Moreover, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights both reflected and contributed to the growing salience accorded to human rights concerns” (p. 66).In August 1975, Helsinki Conference in Europe reinforced both state sovereignty and human sovereignty. “The Final Act that emerged in 1975 in Helsinki from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a remarkable document [consisted of a ten point agenda]. On one level, it reads as a tribute to the classic Westphalian notion of order. It is a multilateral accord premised on state sovereignty, the impermissibility of the threat or use of force, the inviolability of borders, respect for the territorial integrity of all European states, a commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and acceptance of the principle of nonintervention in one another’s internal affairs. The one exception to this traditional approach was a commitment by all governments to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms within their own borders” (p. 51). The order based on respect for sovereignty continued and could be called World Order 1.0.In August 1990, after Iraq attacked Kuwait (in the twilight of the Cold War), UN spoke for “military force, to liberate Kuwait” couched in the words the ‘use of all necessary means’. Consequently, “An American-led international coalition accomplished the mission in short order, demonstrating the existence of a balance of power in the Middle East upheld by the United States and that strongly favoured those preferring a version of the status quo to far-reaching change” (p. 104). In this way, the Westphalian order based on state sovereignty was restored.After the end of the Cold War in December 1991, the international system has not only experienced certain structural changes but also saw the diffusion of capacity into more hands than ever before. Consequently, there have emerged more decision makers and independent actors affecting the course of events both regionally and globally. The consequent challenges have made the world fall into disarray [i.e. confusion] and head for a disorder. “[T]he trend toward disorder has been a function of structural changes in the international system – above all, the diffusion of capacity into more hands than ever before – exacerbated at critical times by the action (and inaction) of the United States and other powers” (p. 211). This is how globalization has come into action. “Globalization, with its vast, fast flows of just about anything and everything real and imaginable across borders, is a reality that governments often cannot monitor, much less manage. The gap between the challenges generated by globalization and the ability of a word to cope with them appears to be widening in a number of critical domains” (p. 11).Globalization is with consequences. “A cardinal reality associated with globalization is that little stays local in terms of its consequences…Almost anyone and anything, from tourists, terrorists, and both migrants and refugees to e-mails, weapons, viruses, dollars, and greenhouse gases, can travel on one of the many conveyor belts that are modern globalization and reach any and every corner of the globe. So much of what has historically been viewed as domestic and hence off-limits because it took place within the borders of a sovereign country is now potentially unlimited in its reach and effects. The result is that we no longer have the luxury of viewing all of what goes on in another country as off-limits” (p. 226). This is how globalization has challenged the sovereignty-dominated international system. “In addition, the realities of globalization and the potential for contagion gave all governments a stake in one another’s adopting responsible practices” (p. 148).Globalization has brought its own challenges. “The result is a world not just of more capacity in more hands but also of more decision makers and independent actors. Consequently, a host of global and regional challenges have emerged that are proving to be far more than the major powers can contend with. A short list of these challenges would include the actual and potential spread of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, terrorism, a spike in the number of refugees and displaced persons, a chaotic Middle East, a Europe under siege, a precariously balanced Asia-Pacific, a largely ungoverned cyberspace, an inadequate response to climate change, a growing rejection of free trade and immigration, and the potential for a pandemic that could cost many millions of lives” (p. 211). These challenges shove the world towards disarray.In the presence of globalization the World Order 1.0 has gone inadequate to meet the emerging complications born out of globalization affecting all sections of the globe. Consequently, a problem in one country cannot be confined to one country and it is bound to grip other countries and the formula of respect for sovereignty is failing to offer a solution.In September 2005, the United Nations convened a World Summit and asked all member states to practice sovereign responsibility. “What gradually emerged from this conundrum was the notion of “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P, as it became widely known. The idea was enshrined in a 2005 statement of a “World Summit” convened by the United Nations. ‘Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’ Such a statement of sovereign responsibility was significant. But what made R2P even more significant was an associated notion, namely, that the ‘international community’ also had the responsibility to help to protect populations from the same four threats, including through the use of military force if need be, regardless of whether the government of the country involved asked for it or even if it opposed outside involvement. The world’s governments expressed their preparedness to take ‘collective action in a timely and decisive manner’ on a case-by-case basis, acting in concert with the relevant regional organization or the UN itself” (p. 116).In this way, whereas the Westphalian treaty focused on regulating the external behavior of states, the 2005 statement of the World Summit focused on regulating the internal behavior of states. Secondly, other governments or the international community was empowered (in both right and responsibility) to act to protect innocent people when their government fails to or could not do so (to fulfill the needs of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). In this way, human sovereignty of a citizen was attached to the right and responsibility of states, other than the native state, besides diluting the sovereignty of a host states.The statement was also a restraining factor. “The notion that governments enjoy a relatively free hand to act as they wish within their borders. This concept has been constrained by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [December 1948] and the Genocide Convention [December 1948]. It has also been conditioned by the promulgation and widespread acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect [R2P] doctrine” (p. 234). The mere presence of the restraining factor made several countries suspicious of R2P. “Not surprisingly, R2P is viewed with unease or outright suspicion by many governments that fear it might be used against them by those with hostile agendas. It can also be cited (as was done by Vladimir Putin in the case of purportedly acting on behalf of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine) [in August 2014] as justification for intervening in the domestic affairs of another country. Such an interpretation is reminiscent of pre-Westphalian times” (p. 227).Here lies a problem. “[S]tate sovereignty constituted the fundamental building block of international order” (p. 104). “One of the widely shared principles of the post-World War II era was the notion of self-determination, that people living in colonies had the right to have sovereign, independent countries of their own. The principle was so broadly embraced that it often included sympathy and even outright support for the use of violence in its pursuit. Self-determination was thus a fundamental tenet of the post-World War II order” (p. 107-108).There are found three kind of states. “It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that the dominant foreign policy challenges confronting the United States and the world for much of the 1990s stemmed from internal conflicts of this variety and from weak rather than strong states. Strong states need no definition, but weak states arguably do. What makes a state weak is not an inability to project military power or fight wars beyond its borders so much as its inability to control what takes place within its borders. It is a lack of capacity, one that often leads to large swaths of territory (often termed ‘ungoverned spaces’) being outside the writ of the government. A failed state is simply the extreme version of a weak state, one in which governmental authority effectively collapses, leading to chaos, the rise of local gangs and militias ruling over parts of the country, or both” (p. 111). The first example was Iraq, then Somalia, Haiti and Rawanda, open space for humanitarian intervention.If a right of self-determination and humanitarian intervention remain separate, it is fine but not otherwise if both coalesce. “But less clear and certainly less broadly embraced was the notion of a right of self-determination for peoples living within established nation-states. Unlike those seeking to get out from under colonial rule, self-determination broadly applied would not be a one-time affair. To the contrary, it could be potentially unlimited in its application. What is more, if it applied to groups living within countries, it threatened the idea and the ideal of state sovereignty, in that sovereignty could be attacked and undermined not just from the outside but from within. It was thus a potential threat to the integrity of many countries as well as to the basis of international order” (p. 108).Related to R2P, the message of worry for China, Russia and India was that “what might be described as diluted sovereignty could be turned against them if they ever felt compelled to do things at home that outsiders found objectionable. Later (in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan intervention) they became even more concerned when they saw what began as a humanitarian intervention quickly evolve into something much more, that is, regime change. This experience reinforced their deepest fear that R2P represented the thin end of the wedge of a new, dangerous approach to sovereignty that could all too easily be turned not just against their interests but against them” (p. 117). However, the difference between Iraq’s and Russia’s cases on violation of respect for borders (by annexing Kuwait and Crimea) was that the former was dealt with militarily whereas the latter was dealt with financially by imposing economic sanctions.The solution lies in improving upon the concept of sovereignty as adopting sovereign obligation (i.e. besides having right and responsibility, sovereign states also have obligations to others, both states and their citizens) which may establish World Order 2.0.World Order 2.0Whereas the World Order 1.0 (1648-1991) was about sovereignty of states, the World Order 2.0 is about sovereign obligation. “[T]he need to develop and gain support for a definition of legitimacy that embraces not just the rights but also the obligations of sovereign states vis-à-vis other governments and countries…I call this concept ‘sovereign obligation’, [which] … is fundamentally different from the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility,’ which involves a government’s responsibilities to its own citizens and how it forfeits some of the traditional protections and benefits of sovereignty if it fails to live up to those responsibilities, as in R2P” (p. 227). Nevertheless, “[S]overeign obligation is…about a government’s obligation to other governments and through them to the citizens of other countries” (p. 228).A reflection of sovereign obligation can viewed in one instance. “On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorizing member states to both ‘take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ [in Libya] and establish a no-fly zone over the whole of the country. Soon after, a ‘humanitarian intervention’ is carried out by a coalition of NATO members led by the Europeans, with the United States ‘leading from behind’ ” (p. 161). However, humanitarian intervention does not come without challenge. “If the United States or any other party calls for and carries out an intervention in the name of R2P, it must be limited to a humanitarian intervention. This is also a matter of sovereign obligation. What happened in Libya, where regime change masqueraded as R2P, undermined the very doctrine it sought to fulfill. If for some reason regime change is sought, it ought to be articulated as such and kept apart from R2P even if the motivation is partly or entirely humanitarian” (p. 236).ConclusionFor realizing the goal of sovereign obligation, cooperation of all countries or willing countries is required. “[T]he United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges…Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy [and]… it represents realism for an era of globalization. It is also a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War” (p. 288). That is, multilateralism is needed to meet the goal of sovereign obligation under World Order 2.0.